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DRUGS: YOU USE, YOU GAIN? WHY
COURTS SHOULD UPHOLD LONG-TERM
DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR RECOVERING
ADDICTS
Gregory M. Juell*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2004, a member of a Massachusetts hospital’s nursing
staff found Dr. Julie Colby, an anesthesiologist, unconscious on a
hospital table.1 Dr. Colby had served as a partner in a Merrimack
anesthesiology practice for sixteen years when she became
addicted to Fentanyl, an opioid commonly used in the practice.2
She took a leave of absence to enter an inpatient substance
treatment facility, where she was diagnosed with an opioid
dependence, depression, and obsessive-compulsive personality
traits.3 Pursuant to her employer’s group employee benefit plan,
her insurer provided long-term disability (LTD) benefits during
inpatient treatment.4 She remained at the treatment facility until
November 2004 when she left to begin outpatient treatment,
during which she was under regular medical supervision and did
not resume her use of Fentanyl.5 Nevertheless, the Massachusetts
Board of Registration in Medicine revoked her license and her
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; A.B., Dartmouth College,
2007. I would like to thank the Journal staff, for their helpful comments and
edits; my sister, for inspiring my interest in the public health; and my parents,
for their unending encouragement and support.
1
Brief of Plaintiff–Appellee at 3, Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d
58 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2270).
2
Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013).
3
4
5

Id.
Id. See infra Part II for more background on LTD benefits.
Colby, 705 F.3d at 60.
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insurer refused to provide benefits for any of her outpatient
treatment because it did not consider her risk of relapse a
“current disability” under her employee benefit plan.6
Unfortunately, Dr. Colby’s experience is not particularly rare
among anesthesiologists. A 2005 study surveying anesthesiology
residency programs from 1991 to 2001 determined that eighty
percent of programs reported opioid abuse among residents and
nineteen percent reported pretreatment fatalities from opioid
abuse.7 While most residents attempted to reenter anesthesiology
after treatment, only forty-six percent who attempted reentry had
completed an anesthesiology residency at the time of the survey.
The substance-related death rate for those who remained in
anesthesiology was nine percent.8 Forty percent of those who
were treated and returned to medicine ultimately entered another
specialty.9 Long-term follow-up for treated residents indicated
that fifty-six percent were successful in medicine, though often in
a different specialty.10
Possible factors contributing to high rates of drug abuse
among anesthesiologists include: ease of access to highly
addictive drugs, the ease of diverting small quantities for personal
use, a high-stress work environment, and the increased sensitivity

Id.; see also Plaintiff Julie Colby’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief at 9, Colby v. Assurant Emp.
Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 07-11488-RCL). The
plan at issue defined “total disability” as “an injury, sickness, or pregnancy
[that] requires that you be under the regular care and attendance of a doctor,
and prevents you from performing at least one of the material duties of your
regular occupation.” Complaint at 4, Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F.
Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 07CV11488). Disabilities must be
“current” in order for individuals to receive benefits. Id.
7
Ethan O. Bryson & Jeffrey H. Silverstein, Addiction and Substance
Abuse in Anesthesiology, 109 ANESTHESIOLOGY 905, 905 (2008).
8
Gregory B. Collins et al., Chemical Dependency Treatment Outcomes
of Residents in Anesthesiology: Results of a Survey, 101 ANESTHESIA &
ANALGESIA 1457, 1457 (2005).
9
Id. at 1459.
10
Id. at 1460. Long-term follow-up data was available for ninety-three
percent (185/199) of the study residents. Id.
6
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of the brain’s reward pathways11 resulting from workplace
exposure to the drug.12 Unsurprisingly then, anesthesiologists and
others in the field are common plaintiffs in Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)13 actions against insurers that deny
LTD benefits to individuals recovering from substance abuse
disorders.14
Because of the prevalence of anesthesiologist plaintiffs in
cases determining whether recovering addicts should be entitled
to LTD benefits, the cases discussed in this Note focus on the
anesthesiology context. However, whether insurers should be
required to provide LTD benefits to recovering addicts is an
important question in any field, particularly those in which the
public health and safety are at risk. Additionally, this Note
focuses on ERISA-governed LTD plans. As the following
discussion will demonstrate, it is in this context that the case for
treating the risk of relapse as a “current disability” is particularly
strong. However, many of the arguments that follow will be
equally applicable outside of the ERISA context.
Courts are divided as to whether the risk of relapse into drug
addiction constitutes a “current disability.”15 Under LTD benefit
plans, a disability is generally defined for the first year or two as
11

Reward pathways are the parts of the brain that are “responsible for
driving our feelings of motivation, reward and behavior.” See The Reward
Pathway Reinforces Behavior, GENETIC SCI. LEARNING CTR.,
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/addiction/rewardbehavior/ (last visited
Mar. 5, 2014).
12
Bryson & Silverstein, supra note 7, at 905.
13
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
14
See, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013);
Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich.
2009). For more information on ERISA, see infra Part I.
15
Compare Colby, 705 F.3d 58 (upholding reversal of LTD benefit
denial), with Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008)
(upholding LTD benefit denial). The disability plan at issue in Stanford defined
disability as “injury or Sickness [that] causes physical or mental impairment to
such a degree of severity that You are . . . continuously unable to perform the
Material and Substantial Duties of Your Regular Occupation.” Brief of
Appellant at 10, Stanford, 514 F.3d 354 (No. 06-2006). For a claimant to be
entitled to benefits, his disability must therefore be “current.” Id.
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a condition that prevents one from engaging in his regular
occupation.16 Afterward, the definition changes: it requires that
the individual be unable to perform any gainful occupation.17
If a court determines that the risk of relapse is a “current
disability,” then it will require the insurer to provide benefits
under standard LTD benefit plans.18 The First and Fourth Circuits
have come to opposite conclusions on this issue.19 The First
Circuit in Colby v. Union Security Insurance Co.20 determined
that the risk of relapse into drug abuse is akin to the risk of
relapse into cardiac distress or orthopedic complications, and can
therefore be so severe as to constitute a current disability for
which LTD benefits must be provided. The court explained that a
current disability could exist even when an individual is
physically capable of performing his job.21
By contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Stanford v. Continental
Casualty Co.22 came to a different conclusion. In Stanford, the
insurer had determined that the “potential risk of relapse” is not a
current disability for which LTD benefits must be provided, and
the court held that the insurer did not abuse its discretion in
Diane B. Hill, Employer-Sponsored Long-Term Disability Insurance,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
16,
17
(1987),
http://bls.gov/opub/mlr/1987/07/
art2full.pdf.
16

17
18

Id.

For more traditional types of conditions for which courts have upheld
LTD benefits, see generally Rothman v. Office Env’ts of New England Health
& Welfare Benefit Plan, 794 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D.Ma. 2011) (awarding LTD
benefits to a salesperson who suffered from post-concussion syndrome);
Adams v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ga.
2010) (holding that a plan participant who experienced cognitive problems
following a stroke was entitled to LTD benefits); Alexander v. Winthrop,
Simpson, Putnam & Roberts Long Term Disability Coverage, 497 F. Supp. 2d
429 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (upholding LTD benefits to a legal secretary who
suffered from persistent and severe lower back pain).
19
Compare Colby, 705 F.3d 58 (upholding reversal of LTD benefit
denial), with Stanford, 514 F.3d 354 (upholding LTD benefit denial).
20
Colby, 705 F.3d at 59–60.
21
Id. at 66.
22
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358–59.
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making this determination.23 The court ruled that while the risk of
relapse into cardiac arrest is a likely result of a stressful work
environment, the risk of relapse into substance abuse is a
choice.24 Also in contrast to the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
distinguished heart conditions from drug addiction on the ground
that one who is heart attack-prone has a current physical
impairment, while one who risks relapse into substance
dependence does not.25 The court agreed with the insurer that the
mere risk of relapse is not a current disability for which the
insurer must provide LTD benefits.26
This Note examines whether the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Stanford was justified and asserts that Stanford contravenes both
Supreme Court precedent and the congressional intent that
motivated ERISA’s passage. Furthermore, Stanford is at odds
with current psychology literature, which views addiction as a
disease rather than a choice, and there is no compelling reason
why ERISA plan administrators should treat the risk of relapse
differently from other chronic medical conditions. Finally, the
Fourth Circuit failed to properly take into account the potentially
disastrous public policy consequences of Stanford. The First
Circuit’s decision in Colby is more firmly grounded in law and
psychology, and it makes for better public policy. Colby
therefore provides better guidance for future courts confronted
with the issue of whether to construe the risk of relapse as a
disability for which LTD benefits should be provided.
Part II provides a brief historical background of ERISA and
LTD benefits. Part III details the differences between Colby and
Stanford, and discusses related decisions by other courts.27 Part
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 361.

John Utz questions whether Colby and Stanford truly created a circuit
split because the two courts were interpreting different plans. John L. Utz,
Addict’s Risk of Relapse as Disability, 21 ERISA LITIG. REP., no. 2, 2013, at
6. However, a true split is apparent given the courts’ completely divergent
attitudes regarding the nature of addiction. Utz’s skepticism also ignores Judge
Wilkinson’s dissenting opinion in Stanford, which was echoed in Colby, and
27
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IV examines recent psychology literature on addiction and how
scholars in the field have come to regard addiction as a disease
rather than a choice. Finally, Part V examines why Stanford is
flawed and argues that courts should therefore follow the First
Circuit in treating the risk of relapse into substance abuse as a
“current disability.”
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND LTD BENEFITS
During the Second World War, several economic factors
contributed to an older workforce in the years that followed.28
One factor was wartime inflation, which discouraged retirement
by reducing the value of Social Security Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance.29 Another was the policy of many firms to directly
discourage retirement.30 Due to the resulting older workforce,
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) unions began to
prioritize the interests of older workers by emphasizing
retirement benefits in their collective bargaining agreements.31
However, increased retirement benefits for older workers
typically came at the expense of liberal vesting requirements and
other policies that would have benefited younger workers.32
Additionally, CIO unions often bargained for systems requiring
employers to lay off workers in reverse order of seniority.33
Events at Studebaker-Packard34 highlighted the vulnerability
demonstrates how judges’ differing attitudes toward addiction can result in
sharply different interpretations of a benefit plan. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at
361–65 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
28
James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the
Business”: the Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 683, 687 (2001).
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688. When funds are “vested,” an employee has an absolute right

to them. Employers cannot reclaim vested funds.
33
34

Id.

Studebaker was an American automobile manufacturer. It merged with
the Packard Motor Car Company in 1954 to form Studebaker-Packard. Due to
poor sales, Packard ceased operations in 1958. Studebaker continued to
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of younger workers under these systems.35 During the 1950s,
adverse economic events, such as the loss of wartime defense
contracts and a recession, made it more difficult for independent
automobile manufacturers to compete with larger firms.36 As a
result of these events, in December 1963 Studebaker-Packard
closed its plant in South Bend, Indiana.37 To make matters worse
for the employees, Studebaker-Packard’s pension plan lacked
adequate funds and the company defaulted on its obligations to
workers under sixty, with some workers receiving nothing at
all.38 This was the result of a 1961 collective bargaining
agreement, which favored older workers by prioritizing retirees
and retirement-eligible employees over younger workers.39 The
plant’s shutdown gained national attention when advocates of
pension reform repeatedly invoked the default as a symbol of the
need for regulation and reform.40
While the closing of
Studebaker-Packard became a rallying cry for pension reform
advocates, pension reform remained controversial and it took
more than a decade for substantial reform to occur.41
The reform effort culminated on Labor Day in 1974, when
President Gerald Ford signed into law the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).42 Congress enacted ERISA in
order to ensure that employees actually receive promised benefits
in accordance with a benefit plan’s terms.43 To this end, ERISA
imposes minimum standards for private industry pension plan
manufacture cars until 1966. History, STUDEBAKER NAT’L MUSEUM,
http://www.studebakermuseum.org/p/about/history/ (last visited Apr. 25,
2014).
35
Wooten, supra note 28, at 684.
36
Id. at 693.
37
Id. at 683–84.
38
Id. at 684.
39
Id. at 731.
40
Id. at 684.
41
Id. at 739.
42
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
43
LEE T. POLK, 1 ERISA PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2013). See
also 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
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administrators and creates causes of action for plan participants
and their beneficiaries.44 ERISA-imposed duties are derived from
the common law of trusts.45 Fiduciaries are therefore required to
discharge their duties with the prudence of a reasonable man
under like circumstances.46 They must also “act solely in the
interests of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive
purposes of providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses
of the plan.”47 The statute creates a private cause of action against
plan administrators who fail to meet their obligations.48 While
ERISA sets a benefit floor, employers can choose to provide
greater benefits.49 Courts may therefore enforce a contractual
obligation to provide benefits beyond what the statute requires.50
ERISA’s “standards of fiduciary responsibility” govern both
“pension plans” and “welfare plans.”51 “Pension plans” include
an array of deferred compensation plans, while “welfare plans”
include a variety of benefits, such as disability insurance.52 LTD
insurance is designed to provide income to employees who are
unable to work for extended periods due to prolonged disability.53
ERISA, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/erisa (last
visited Mar. 5, 2014). ERISA also regulates the impact of federal income taxes
on the management of benefit plans. Id.
45
POLK, supra note 43, § 1:6. Trust law establishes principles by which
one holds property for another’s benefit.
46
H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4659 (2007). ERISA defines a “fiduciary” as
the entity that manages the benefit plan and its assets. Often, both an employer
and a hired administrator will serve as benefit plan fiduciaries. ERISA
Fiduciary
Advisor,
DEPT.
OF
LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/ebsa/fiduciary/q4a.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
47
2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D ERISA – Arbitrary Denial of Benefits
Under Disability Income Plan § 1 (1988).
48
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
49
PAUL J. ROUTH, WELFARE BENEFITS GUIDE § 2:27 (1973).
44

50

Id.

51

POLK, supra note 43, § 1:3.

52

Id.

ROUTH, supra note 49, § 2:27 (“It is not uncommon for a plan to
provide that disability means the inability to perform one’s regular duties for
two years. After that, the definition often changes requiring the person to
demonstrate an inability to perform any occupation for which the employee is
reasonably qualified.”). This ongoing inability is what renders a disability
53
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The income amount is generally a predetermined percentage of
the employee’s pre-disability earnings.54 Employees typically
must have worked for an employer for a period of five months to
a year before becoming eligible for LTD benefits.55 In addition,
employees must be disabled for an extended period, usually three
to five months, before LTD benefits begin.56 Thus, the LTD
benefit period typically begins when the short-term disability
period ends.57 LTD benefit payments are generally payable until
recovery, a specific age, or retirement.58 Additionally, LTD
payments may be reduced if an employee is only partially
disabled, meaning the employee can either perform some duties
of his original occupation or can perform another occupation in
which his earnings are reduced.59
In an action for benefits, the court’s standard of review will
depend on whether the plan gives the administrator discretion to
construe the plan’s terms.60 If the administrator is given no such
discretion, the court will review the denial of benefits de novo.61
If the administrator is given such discretion, the court will apply
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,62 a deferential
standard in which reversal is only appropriate if the lower court
has failed to exercise sound and reasonable judgment.63 However,
if an administrator with discretion is operating under a conflict of
interest, the reviewing court will consider this as a factor in

“current.”
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Diane B. Hill, Employer-Sponsored Long-Term Disability Insurance,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 16, 16 (1987), available at http://bls.gov/opub/
mlr/1987/07/art2full.pdf.
59
Id. at 17.
60
RONALD J. COOKE, 3 ERISA PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 8:46 (2013).
58

61
62
63

Id.
Id.
Abuse of Discretion, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/

wex/abuse_of_discretion (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
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determining whether the administrator has abused its discretion.64
III.RISK OF RELAPSE AS A CURRENT DISABILITY
Courts are conflicted as to whether the risk of relapse into
substance abuse constitutes a “current” disability under LTD
plans.65 As noted earlier, the First and Fourth Circuits disagree
on this issue. The Fourth Circuit contends that the risk of relapse
involves a choice component and is not a continuous disability,66
while the First Circuit asserts that the risk may be so severe as to
render an individual “currently” disabled.67 However, such
disagreement is not confined to the First and Fourth Circuits.68
Below is an overview of cases addressing this important question.

A. Cases Upholding the Denial of Benefits
1. Stanford v. Continental Casualty Co.69
Robert Stanford worked as a nurse anesthetist at Beaufort
Memorial Hospital in South Carolina when he became addicted to
Fentanyl, an anesthetic used in his practice.70 After completing a
twenty-eight-day inpatient treatment program, he returned to
work only to relapse two months later.71 He then began a ninetyday inpatient treatment program and filed for LTD benefits
COOKE, supra note 60, § 8:46.
Compare, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.
2013) (requiring LTD benefits), with Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514
F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding LTD benefit denial).
66
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358 (“Whether [an addict] succumbs to that
temptation remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such
choice.”).
67
Colby, 705 F.3d at 60 (“[A] risk of relapse into substance dependence .
. . can swell to so significant a level so as to constitute a current disability.”).
68
However, the First and Fourth Circuits are the only federal appeals
courts to have addressed this question.
69
Id. at 354; Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 438
(E.D.N.C. 2006).
70
Stanford, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
71
Id. at 440; Stanford, 514 F.3d at 364.
64
65
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pursuant to his employer’s disability plan, administered by
insurer Continental Casualty Company.72
The insurer initially granted Mr. Stanford’s request for LTD
benefits.73 However, after Mr. Stanford spent several months in
recovery, the insurer terminated his benefits, citing a lack of
medical evidence that he was functionally unable to perform “the
material and substantial duties of [his] regular occupation.”74 Mr.
Stanford appealed the insurer’s decision to terminate his
benefits.75 Along with the appeal, he submitted a letter from his
treating physician, which stated that he could not return to work
as a nurse anesthetist because he should not be subjected to
controlled substances and because the effects of his treatment
medication could put patients at risk.76 After the insurer denied
the appeal, Mr. Stanford filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina alleging
wrongful termination of benefits.77 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the insurer, stating that the risk of relapse
did not render Mr. Stanford disabled because he was not
“continuously unable” to perform his duties.78
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court.79 It took a
narrow view of what constituted a “mental impairment” under the
insurer’s ERISA-governed plan and stated that while Mr.
Stanford could not return to his old job, he was nevertheless
“physically and mentally capable of performing that job and
countless other jobs.”80 It further argued that addiction is a
choice: “[w]hether [an addict] succumbs to that temptation
remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such
choice.”81 The court therefore upheld the insurer’s determination
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Stanford, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 440–41.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 443.
Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 359.
Id. at 358.
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that “Stanford no longer suffered from physical or mental
impairments as a result of his drug use or his recovery, [and] the
fact that he remained an addict did not [prevent him from
performing] the material and substantial duties of [his] regular
occupation.”82
However, the Stanford court was sharply divided. Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson wrote an impassioned dissent, describing the
majority’s conclusion as “an uncommonly harsh result.”83 He
argued that the majority’s holding rested on two “abstractions”
not grounded in law.84 The majority’s first “abstraction” was that
a disability plan was not required to cover “potential risk of
relapse.”85 According to Judge Wilkinson, the majority’s
rejection of “potential risk of relapse” as a current impairment
appeared to exclude all serious medical conditions that could
make performing one’s job “unreasonably dangerous” because an
individual could technically perform a job function at grave
medical risk.86 According to Judge Wilkinson, such an exclusion
contravened “a basic tenet of insurance law that an insured is
disabled when the activity in question would aggravate a serious
condition affecting the insured’s health.”87 The second
“abstraction” was the majority’s assertion “that for disability
purposes, ‘a physical condition such as a heart attack . . . is
different from the risk of relapse into drug use.’”88 Judge
Wilkinson stated that the majority’s attempt to distinguish these
conditions was insufficient, as it rested on “moral considerations”
that were not the court’s to make.89
Judge Wilkinson also argued that the majority’s position was

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 361 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 362–63 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 363. As an example, he explained that a laborer who could

literally lift heavy objects, but only at the risk of partial paralysis, would likely
prevail in an action for benefits. Id.
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unsupported by the plan’s plain language.90 He noted that the plan
covered “mental impairments” severe enough that one is “unable
to perform the material and substantial duties of [his] regular
occupation.”91 He defined “mental impairments” more broadly
than the majority and pointed out that the plan defined “mental
impairments” according to the American Psychiatric
Association’s diagnostic manual, which devotes an entire section
to substance-related disorders, including addiction.92
Judge Wilkinson also made strong public policy arguments
against the majority’s holding.93 He pointed out that the insurer’s
requirement that Mr. Stanford relapse in order to obtain disability
benefits would not only create, as the majority acknowledged, a
“perverse-incentive structure” by only paying benefits upon
relapse, but would “thwart the very purpose for which disability
plans exist: to help people overcome medical adversity if
possible, and otherwise to cope with it.”94 Because he did not
believe that the risk of relapse could be categorically excluded
from coverage, he argued that the proper inquiry as to whether a
condition constitutes a current disability is “fact-intensive” and
should focus on the likelihood and severity of the risk.95 Judge
Wilkinson concluded that Mr. Stanford’s prior relapses and the
extensive medical evidence indicating that his risk of relapse was
severe rendered him “currently” disabled.96

2. Allen v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co.97
Allen v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co, while not based on an
ERISA claim, involves facts similar to Stanford.98 In Allen, Dr.
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 362.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 364–65.

Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
Id. at 1378–81. Allen’s plan was not ERISA-governed because he
purchased it individually, not through his employer.
98
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Robert Lee Allen, an anesthesiologist who practiced in Virginia,
brought a breach of contract claim against his disability insurer
claiming wrongful termination of his benefits.99 Dr. Allen had
been employed at Anesthesia Associates of Hampton for only a
month when he began abusing Fentanyl.100 However, less than
three months after entering an inpatient treatment program, he
was discharged with a favorable prognosis for recovery provided
that he adhere to a prescribed treatment plan.101
Nevertheless, the Virginia Board of Medicine suspended Dr.
Allen’s license.102 However, it stayed the suspension provided
that Dr. Allen confine his medical practice to a Board-approved
residency or fellowship.103 Dr. Allen eventually completed a
residency in internal medicine and the Board reinstated his license
to practice medicine on unrestricted status.104 Two months into his
subsequent employment as an internist at Fayette Medical, his
insurer notified him that it would discontinue his benefit
payments.105 Although Dr. Allen was successfully reemployed, he
was not engaged in his “regular occupation,” so he argued that he
was entitled to continued benefits.106 However, the court ruled
that he was not “unable to engage in [his] regular occupation.”107
The court therefore upheld the insurer’s denial because Dr. Allen
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1379.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1380.
103
Id. Dr. Allen commenced a residency in internal medicine shortly
99

100

thereafter, although he returned to inpatient treatment due to concerns that he
was violating Board-imposed restrictions on his practice. However, undisputed
evidence indicated that he had not abused Fentanyl or alcohol since his initial
treatment. Id.
104
Id. at 1380–81.
105
Id. at 1381.
106
Id. at 1383.
107
Id. (emphasis added). The plan defined “disability” as follows: “You
have a disability if, because of continuing sickness or injury, you (1) are under
the regular, reasonable, and customary care of a physician; and (2) are unable
to engage in your regular occupation,” provided that “you are not earning
more than 30% of your prior average earned income from your regular
occupation.” Id. at 1378–79.
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“suffer[ed] from no physical or mechanical limitations on his
ability to practice anesthesiology.”108 It further determined that
even though Dr. Allen’s treating physician testified that he should
not return to practicing anesthesiology, the physician based his
opinion on “future potentialities” only, not on any present
disability.109
The court also based its decision on its determination that Dr.
Allen’s disability was not “uninterrupted,” as the plan required.110
This conclusion was based partially on the testimony of Dr.
Allen’s treating physician, who provided testimony about his
anesthesiologist patients generally, and stated that in most cases,
he recommends a return to the field.111 The physician also gave
testimony specific to Dr. Allen, and opined that Dr. Allen should
avoid returning to anesthesiology because of the likelihood of
relapse.112 The court evidently gave more weight to the general
testimony than the testimony specific to Dr. Allen.113 It
interpreted the treating physician’s claim—that he recommends
most of his patients return to anesthesiology—as an indication
“that drug addiction does not itself disable someone from
practicing in that field.”114 It also noted Dr. Allen’s sobriety
period and a lack of evidence “that he would inevitably
regress.”115 The court determined that Dr. Allen had no “existing
impediment” to his ability to practice anesthesiology and upheld
the denial of Dr. Allen’s benefit payments.116
Id. at 1383. While the Colby court determined that the
anesthesiologist’s “current occupation” was that of a physician, the Allen court
defined “current occupation” more specifically to mean anesthesiologist. See
generally Utz, supra note 27 (discussing a possible circuit split over the
definition of “own occupation” under ERISA-governed LTD benefit plans).
109
Allen, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1383.
110
Id. at 1384. The plan required a “continuing disability,” which the
court interpreted to mean an “uninterrupted” disability. Id. at 1383.
108

111
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
Id. at 1383–84.
Id.
Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
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3. Price v. Disability RMS117
While anesthesiologists are more likely than other physicians
to abuse drugs, a stressful work environment and easy access to
potent drugs contribute to addiction among other physicians as
well. Dr. Howard Price had worked as a urologist and surgeon at
Milford-Whitinsville Regional Hospital in Massachusetts when he
was forced to stop work because he began abusing opioids.118
However, Dr. Price’s insurer denied his claim for LTD benefits
because he had not used opioids during the policy’s two-year
coverage period, which began when Dr. Price stopped
working.119 After the insurer denied his two subsequent appeals,
Dr. Price brought an ERISA action, claiming his depression,
anxiety, and risk of relapse prevented him from performing all of
the material duties of his occupation.120
In upholding the insurer’s denial of LTD benefits, the court
placed significant emphasis on a lack of individualized evidence
and Dr. Price’s continued “functional capacity.”121 The court
noted that the letters written by Dr. Price’s substance abuse
counselor spoke only in general terms and did not make specific
references to Dr. Price’s ability to function.122 The court further
noted that the counselor’s delineation of the disability period
included several weeks during which Dr. Price was still
practicing, which further illustrated the generality of the
counselor’s testimony and its failure to illustrate a “functional

117

Price v. Disability RMS, No. 06-10251-GAO, 2008 WL 763255 (D.
Mass. Mar. 21, 2008).
118
Id. at *1.
119
Id. at *17–18.
120
Id. at *1.
121
Id. at *18. As used in the opinion, “functional capacity” is simply the
ability to practice medicine. See id. at *6.
122
Id. at *19 (“[The doctor’s letter] did not relate the described symptoms
in any persuasive way to Dr. Price’s functional capacity. How poor [was his
concentration]? Did his poor concentration prevent him from performing his
duties? [W]hat must be shown is that the illness caused a loss in functional
capacity, and that is what was missing.”).
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impairment.”123
Price is readily distinguishable from Stanford and Allen.
Since the court found that Dr. Price did not have a severe risk of
relapse, it never reached the question of whether a risk of relapse
could be so severe as to constitute a current disability.124 Also,
unlike the Allen court, the Price court considered testimony
specific to Dr. Price in making its determination that Dr. Price’s
risk of relapse did not constitute a current disability.125 Because of
these differences, it is unclear whether the court’s conclusion
would have been different had Dr. Price’s risk of relapse been
more severe.
As the above cases reveal, courts upholding denial of benefits
generally place significant emphasis on an addict’s lack of
“functional impairment.” Because the risk of relapse does not
necessarily cause a continuous physical inability to perform one’s
occupation, these courts do not view the risk of relapse as a
current disability.

B. Cases Enforcing Continued Benefits
1. Colby v. Union Security Insurance Co.126
The First Circuit’s Colby decision rested on the court’s
determination that a risk of relapse, while not necessarily a
functional impairment, could be so serious as to constitute a
“current disability” under an ERISA plan.127 The opinion cited
medical testimony on behalf of Dr. Colby and determined that
she faced a very significant risk of relapse following her
departure from inpatient treatment.128 The court noted that the
insurer could have possibly “limit[ed] the period of disability by
arguing that this risk progressively diminished over the 36-month

123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id. at *21–22.
Id.
Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 64.
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period,”129 but instead “took a categorical approach, steadfastly
maintaining that risk of relapse, whatever the degree, could not
constitute a current disability under the plan.”130 The award of a
full three years of benefits therefore “flowed naturally from [the
insurer’s] all-or-nothing defense of the case.”131
The First Circuit also relied on a number of policy grounds in
reaching its conclusion.132 For example, the court noted that
denying benefits to those in recovery while providing them to
those actively using the drug would create “a perverse
incentive.”133 In addition, denying benefits to those in recovery
would encourage claimants to return to work immediately upon
leaving inpatient treatment, which could put their lives and their
patients’ lives at risk.134 Finally, such a policy would defeat the
very purpose of a disability plan, which is to help people
overcome or otherwise cope with medical issues.135
However, the court also emphasized the narrowness of its
holding. As noted above, though the court held that Dr. Colby
was entitled to LTD benefits,136 the insurer’s all-or-nothing
approach helped the court reach that conclusion. The court
suggested that the insurer might have had more success had it
argued for a gradual benefit decrease over the 36-month period.137
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the insurer could have
written into the policy an exclusion for risk of relapse, but it
chose not to.138 Therefore, it ruled that the insurer acted
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
Id. For an overview of the facts of this case, see supra Part I.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id. Judge Wilkinson expressed doubt that such an exclusion would be

permissible: “Since I do not think risk of addictive relapse and other medical
risk can categorically be excluded from coverage, . . . .” Stanford v.
Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 364 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting).
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arbitrarily and capriciously in denying LTD benefits to Dr.
Colby.139

2. Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Insurance Co.140
Dr. Ronald Kufner, an anesthesiologist who suffered from
alcohol and opioid dependence, brought an ERISA claim against
his insurer similar to the claim brought in Colby.141 Dr. Kufner’s
substance abuse issues forced him to stop work and undergo
detoxification and other treatments, which included a week in the
hospital followed by several months in a residential treatment
program.142 Dr. Kufner received short-term disability benefits for
thirteen weeks, and his insurer granted his subsequent request for
LTD benefits.143 After several months, however, the insurer
terminated Dr. Kufner’s benefits since he had increased his work
hours and had not experienced a relapse.144
Dr. Kufner nevertheless maintained that he remained
disabled. While anesthesiologists typically work 70 to 80 hours
per week, Dr. Kufner’s hours were limited to 40 to 50 per week
by orders from his treating physician, who determined that his
hours had to be reduced because a stressful work environment
was a major factor contributing to his substance abuse
problems.145 The treating physician further restricted him from
handling or dispensing opioid analgesics.146 Dr. Kufner contended
that because of these restrictions, his benefit payments should
have continued.147
The court determined, largely on public policy grounds, that
the insurer abused its discretion in discontinuing Dr. Kufner’s
139

Colby, 705 F.3d at 67.

140

Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D.
Mich. 2009).
141
Id. at 787.
142
Id. at 788–89.
143
Id. at 789.
144
145
146
147

Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 787.
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LTD benefits.148 The court criticized the insurer’s decision to cut
benefits in spite of “overwhelming medical evidence supporting a
contrary decision.”149 It further pointed out the perversity of the
insurer’s policy, which would force Dr. Kufner to work to the
point of relapse at which point he would again be eligible for
benefits.150 The court described this policy as one of “benefits
Russian roulette” that put Dr. Kufner’s “career and his patients’
lives at risk.”151 The court explained that because anesthesiology
is incredibly complex and a crucial part of surgery, the insurer’s
denial of benefits constituted a “breach of the public trust.”152
The court also based its holding on the insurer’s ERISAimposed obligation to discharge its duties “solely in the interests
of the participants and beneficiaries.”153 Those obligations hold
insurers to “higher-than-marketplace quality standards” and
require that “administrators provide a full and fair review of
claim denials.”154 According to the court, the insurer relied on
“conclusory ‘peer review’ opinions” by doctors it retained rather
than the extensive medical evidence and treatment records
indicating that Dr. Kufner was unable to return to his previous
level of employment.155 The court concluded that the insurer’s
determination was thus based on financial self-interest and
pointed to Dr. Kufner’s entitlement to the plan’s maximum
allowable benefits as further support for this conclusion.156
The above case law makes clear that whether a court will
148
149

Id. at 796.
Id. This evidence included a letter from his treating physician stating

that he should avoid on-call duty and not work more than 40 hours per week,
another letter from the treating physician saying he could work up to 50 hours
per week but that he remained at risk of relapse, and a letter from his treating
psychiatrist stating that Dr. Kufner could not return to his previous level of
employment. Id. at 793–94.
150
Id. at 796.
151
152
153
154

Id.
Id.
Id. at 796–97.
Id. at 797 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 552 U.S. 105, 115

(2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155
156

Id.
Id.

2014.05.13 JUELL.DOCX

5/20/2014 10:44 AM

DRUGS: YOU USE, YOU GAIN?

1027

uphold LTD benefit payments to a recovering addict will depend
largely upon how broadly or narrowly the court construes
“current disability.” Courts denying benefits commonly interpret
the phrase in a strictly literal sense, at least with regard to
recovering addicts.157 In that vein, they are more likely to view an
addict’s relapse into drug abuse as the choice of an otherwise
healthy person.158 On the other hand, courts ruling that benefits
must be provided generally view addiction as a current
disability—essentially, an ongoing condition.159
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADDICTION
The preceding section demonstrated how a court’s
understanding of addiction can affect the result of a case. If a
court views an addict as one who is not functionally impaired yet
chooses to use drugs, it will likely deny benefits. On the other
hand, if a court views an addict as one who suffers from an
ongoing, current disability, it will likely require that benefits be
paid.
The following section places these differing views of
addiction in the context of recent psychology literature.

A. Basics of Addiction and Environmental Factors that
Precipitate Relapse
Recent psychology literature is at odds with the Fourth
Circuit’s contention that addiction is a choice.160 The New
See Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir.
2008) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s inconsistency in
denying benefits to Mr. Stanford when it would likely provide them to an
individual capable of lifting heavy objects but only at risk of a serious injury).
158
See supra Part III.A.1.
159
Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (“In our
view, a risk of relapse into substance abuse—like risk of relapse into cardiac
distress or risk of relapse into orthopedic complications—can swell to so
significant a level as to constitute a current disability.”).
160
See generally David P. Friedman, Drug Addiction: A Chronically
Relapsing Brain Disease, 70 N.C. MED. J. 35 (2009); see also Philip Gorwood
et al., Genetics of Dopamine Receptors and Drug Addiction, 131 HUM.
157
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England Journal of Medicine describes drug addiction as a

“chronic, relapsing disorder in which compulsive drug-seeking
and drug-taking behavior persists despite serious negative
consequences.”161 While outdated but long-held views often see
addiction as a moral failure or lack of willpower,162 recent
neurobiological research indicates that drug addiction is in fact a
brain disease.163 Drug addiction also has a strong genetic
component: one study estimated that genetic factors are
responsible for approximately half of addiction vulnerability.164
Other research compared drug addiction to atherosclerosis, type 2
diabetes, and hypertension by noting common characteristics such
as incurability, the importance of genetic risk factors, the
influence of lifestyle choices, and the frequency of relapse.165
Finally, one study described drug addiction as a “chronic
relapsing disorder” due to similar rates of treatment adherence
and relapse when compared to type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and
asthma.166 As with these other chronic illnesses, the majority of
recovering addicts experience relapse, often after periods of
significant improvement.167
Despite the similarities between addiction and other chronic
ailments, insurance companies place much greater limitations
upon benefits for recovering addicts.168 Researchers have
GENETICS 803 (2012) (describing drug dependence as a “chronic, relapsing
disorder”); Doug Sellman, The 10 Most Important Things Known About
Addiction, 105 ADDICTION 6, 7 (2010) (describing addiction as a “complex
genetic disease”).
161
Jordi Cami & Magi Farré, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction,
349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 975, 975 (2003).
162
Friedman, supra note 160, at 35 (citing Stephen J. Morse, Medicine
and Morals, Craving and Compulsion, 39 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MISUSE 437,
438–39 (2004) (arguing that addicts should, to some degree, be “held
responsible for addiction-related behavior, such as seeking and using drugs”)).
163
Friedman, supra note 160, at 35.
164
Chuan-Yun Li et al., Genes and (Common) Pathways Underlying Drug
Addiction, 4 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 28, 28 (2008).
165
Friedman, supra note 160, at 36.
166
Sellman, supra note 160, at 8.
167

See id.

168

Friedman, supra note 160, at 36.
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attributed this discrepancy to deeply-held biases and a lack of
positive humanitarian feelings toward addicted individuals,169
which often lead to stigmatization and incarceration rather than
proper treatment.170 The reasons for this lack of “positive
humanitarian attitudes” toward addicts are undoubtedly complex,
but likely explanations include the history of drug illegalization
and the illegal drug trade, as well as a lack of understanding of
addiction science.
Drug addiction has biological effects on the human body that
are not easily overcome. Addiction triggers learning
mechanisms171 and induces chemical and anatomical changes in
the brain.172 Importantly, these changes are not quickly undone,
even during abstinence, and are likely to be a significant factor
contributing to relapse.173 In fact, these drug-induced changes
may take many months or even years to reverse themselves.174 In
addition, brain damage associated with drug addiction may harm
parts of the brain responsible for making long-term decisions,
such as those maximizing long-term welfare over short-term
pleasure.175 Drug abuse can therefore lead to abnormal
functioning in parts of the brain that would normally control
compulsive behavior. These physical changes in a person’s brain
can thus reduce an individual’s ability to resist a drug when
exposed to it.176
169
170

Id.; Sellman, supra note 160, at 8.
Friedman, supra note 160, at 37.

171

A learning mechanism is, as its name implies, a way that the brain
incorporates past experiences to apply them to future situations. Such
mechanisms can include, for example, trial and error comparisons between an
expected reward and an actual reward, and a model-based mechanism in which
the brain makes predictions about an environment and then adapts that
predictive model based on new experiences. See Rick Nauert, Brain Images
Reveal How Learning Strategies Work, PSYCH CENT. NEWS (June 3, 2010),
http://psychcentral.com/news/2010/06/01/brain-images-reveal-how-learningstrategies-work.
172
Friedman, supra note 160, at 35.
173
174
175
176

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Nora Volkow & Ting-Kai Li, Drug Addiction: The Neurobiology of
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Unsurprisingly then, the risk of relapse is one of the most
significant problems in treatment even among individuals who
have sustained a prolonged abstinence period.177 Laboratory
experiments on both humans and animals indicate that primary
triggers of relapse include exposure to cues associated with
previous drug taking, exposure to stressors, and exposure to the
drug itself.178 Other evidence indicates that these factors do not
necessarily operate independently. For example, one study on rats
found that the most potent factors in precipitating relapse after
both short and long periods of abstinence were exposure to a brief
period of stress and exposure to the drug itself.179 It further found
that exposure to the drug itself increases the effect of exposure to
drug-related cues.180 Another study found that exposure to
stressful events can similarly exacerbate the impact of exposure to
drug-related cues on drug-seeking behavior, and vice versa.181
These factors are examined in further detail below.

1. Stress
Exposure to a stressful environment is a significant risk factor
contributing to drug addiction relapse in humans.182 In one study,
opiate-addicted individuals who were shown “stress related
Behavior Gone Awry, 5 NATURE REVIEWS 963, 965 (2004).
177
M.W. Feltenstein & R.E. See, The Neurocircuitry of Addiction: An
Overview, 154 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 261, 261 (2008).
178
Jane Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms of Relapse, 363
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 3147, 3147 (2008)
[hereinafter Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms].
179
Jane Stewart, Pathways to Relapse: The Neurobiology of Drug- and
Stress-Induced Relapse to Drug-Taking, 25 J. PSYCHIATRY & NEUROSCIENCE
125, 125 (2000) [hereinafter Stewart, Pathways to Relapse].
180

Id.

Xiu Liu & Friedbert Weiss, Additive Effect of Stress and Drug Cues
on Reinstatement of Ethanol Seeking: Exacerbation by History of Dependence
and Role of Concurrent Activation of Corticotropin-Releasing Factor and
Opioid Mechanisms, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7856, 7859 (2002).
182
Robyn M. Brown & Andrew Lawrence, Neurochemistry Underlying
Relapse to Opiate Seeking Behavior, 34 NEUROCHEMICAL RES. 1876, 1879
181

(2009).
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imagery” experienced heightened drug cravings.183 Researchers
found similar results in cocaine-addicted individuals, for whom
stress-induced hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis responses
predicted future drug use quantities.184 Animal research likewise
indicates increased drug cravings in response to stress.
Researchers studying relapse behavior found that opiate-addicted
animals that experience foot shock (a small electrical shock to the
foot to induce stress) are more likely to exhibit drug-seeking
behavior.185 This demonstrates a strong correlation between
stressful experiences and heightened drug cravings.
Additionally, research shows that a stressful environment can
actually increase a drug’s pleasurable effect. Stress does this by
“priming” the brain’s reward pathways,186 meaning it increases
the drugs’ efficacy and thus encourages the addict’s continued
use.187 Such research is supported by clinical studies of drug
abusers and alcoholics, in which subjects frequently cite stress as
a reason for relapse.188 Other research indicates that a history of
drug abuse can make individuals more sensitive to stressful events
and thus more vulnerable to relapse.189 These relapse-inducing
Id. This “stress-related imagery” was based on the participants’
descriptions of recent stressful personal events. After viewing the imagery,
participants rated how vividly they could imagine the scenario, the extent of
their opioid craving, and how anxious they felt. See Scott M. Hyman et al.,
183

Stress and Drug-Cue-Induced Craving in Opioid-Dependent Individuals in
Naltrexone
Treatment,
15
EXPERIMENTAL
&
CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 134.
184
Brown & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 1879. The hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) is a system in the brain that triggers the
production and release of various hormones and neurotransmitters in response
to stressful events. These hormones, inter alia, help systems throughout the
body respond to stressful situations. See Anxiety In-Depth Report, N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/symptoms/stress-andanxiety/print.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
185
Brown & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 1881.
186
See The Reward Pathway Reinforces Behavior, supra note 11.
187
Rajita Sinha, How Does Stress Increase the Risk of Drug Relapse and
Abuse?, 158 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 343, 345 (2001).
188
Id. at 351.
189
Stewart, Pathways to Relapse, supra note 179, at 133.
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factors are clearly at play in the anesthesiology context, with its
70 to 80-hour workweeks and on-call duties.

2. Drug-related Cues
As a number of studies have shown, exposure to drug cues
can precipitate relapse by increasing drug cravings.190 These drug
cues fall into two general categories: “discrete” cues and
“contextual” cues.191 A “discrete” cue is a physical object
associated with drug-taking, such as drug paraphernalia.192 A
“contextual” cue is one associated with a background setting,
such as a room in which drugs have been previously used.193 The
resultant heightened craving has been described as a form of
Pavlovian conditioning194 in which drug-addicted organisms can
experience withdrawal symptoms in the presence of the usual
cues, even absent consumption.195 Furthermore, there is evidence
that drug-related cues tend to capture the attention of drug addicts
even when they are involved in an unrelated task.196 This suggests
that the presence of drug cues may cause impulsive drug-seeking
behavior.197
See generally Dan I. Lubman et al., Electrophysiological Evidence of
the Motivational Salience of Drug Cues in Opiate Addiction, 37 PSYCHOL.
MED. 1203 (2007); Shepard Siegel, Drug Tolerance, Drug Addiction, and
Drug Anticipation, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 296 (2005);
Sinha, supra note 187, at 343.
191
Brown & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 1882.
192
Id.
193
Id.
190

194

Pavlovian (classical) conditioning is a learned association between
stimuli. “[T]he subject learns to associate a previously unrelated neutral
stimulus with another stimulus that reliably elicits some kind of reaction.”
Pavlovian
(Classical)
Conditioning,
IND.
UNIV.,
http://www.indiana.edu/~p1013447/
dictionary/pavcond.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
195
Siegel, supra note 190, at 297.
196
Lubman et al., supra note 190, at 1208. In this study, the participants’
task was to press a button as quickly as possible whenever a white cup was
displayed. Id. at 1205.
197
Id. at 1208.
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3. Drug Exposure and its Effects on Stressors and Cues
Greater levels of past drug use often correlate with greater
levels of cue sensitivity.198 In addition, repeated drug use
increases the brain’s stimulus-award associations and forms a
type of “addiction memory” that increases craving.199 Drug
exposure can also change sensitivity to future drug exposure and
stressors.200 To make matters worse for recovering addicts,
stimuli that lead to this type of conditioned response maintain
their effect well into abstinence.201 Even after “extinction
training,”202 in which the ability of cues to provoke relapse is
reduced or eliminated, exposure to stress or the drug itself can
rejuvenate the effects of the conditioned response to
environmental cues.203
As the above studies show, researchers consistently identify
(1) cues associated with previous drug taking; (2) exposure to
stressors; and (3) exposure to the drug itself, as primary triggers
of relapse into drug use. Courts should take a practical approach
and keep these factors in mind when considering whether a
recovering addict should be awarded LTD benefits.

Rajita Sinha, Modeling Stress and Drug Craving in the Laboratory:
Implications for Addiction Treatment Development, 14 ADDICTION BIOLOGY
198

84, 85 (2008).
199
Bryon Adinoff, Neurobiologic Processes in Drug Reward and
Addiction, 12 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 305, 311 (2004).
200
Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms, supra note 178, at
3153.
201
202

Id.

“Extinction training” refers to a process that attempts to disassociate
the drug cue from the drug itself. In animal experimentation this is done, for
example, by training an animal to perform a task that results in the drug’s
administration and then performing “extinction training,” in which the
previous task no longer provides the drug. Id. at 3148.
203
Id. at 3153–54.
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B. Additional Factor: Genetics

Genetics also plays a role in drug addiction.204 Alcoholism has
been shown to have a strong genetic component, and recent
research has provided evidence that drug addiction is also a
heritable disorder.205 It is estimated that genetic factors are
responsible for forty to sixty percent of drug addiction
vulnerability, with environmental factors responsible for the
remainder.206 Animal research indicates the heritability of drug
addiction at 0.4 for hallucinogens, 0.7 for cocaine, and slightly
above 0.5 for alcohol.207 As a result of such studies, addiction has
come to be regarded as a “complex genetic disease.”208
The specific genes involved in addiction are unknown, but
recent data indicate a relationship between drug addiction and the
genes that encode dopamine receptors.209 Specifically, a study of
2,364 current opiate abusers or dependents indicated that the
dopamine D2 receptor bears a highly significant link to the risk of
opiate addiction.210 Dopamine release is necessary for brain
“reward,” and all addictive drugs produce enhanced dopamine
levels.211 This process not only “hijacks” the system normally
Sellman, supra note 160, at 7; Jerzy Vetulani, Drug Addiction. Part II.
Neurobiology of Addiction., 53 POLISH J. PHARMACOLOGY 303, 313 (2001).
205
Sellman, supra note 160, at 7; Vetulani, supra note 204, at 313.
206
See Chuan-Yun Li et al., supra note 164, at 28.
207
Sellman, supra note 160, at 7. “Heritability” is an estimate of the
204

genetic component of a trait, and ranges from zero to one. David Goldman et
al., The Genetics of Addictions: Uncovering the Genes , 6 NATURE REVIEWS:
GENETICS 521, 522 (2005).
208
Sellman, supra note 160, at 7.
209
Gorwood et al., supra note 160, at 803.
210
Id. at 810. “Abuse” is the recurrent use of drugs despite adverse
consequences. “Dependence” is another word for addiction, and manifests
itself through symptoms such as heightened tolerance and withdrawal
symptoms. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPENDIX E:
SUBSTANCE USE, ABUSE, DEPENDENCE CONTINUUM, AND PRINCIPLES OF
EFFECTIVE
TREATMENT,
available
at
http://www.ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/SAFERR_AppendixE.pdf. The cases
cited in this Note involve both abusers and dependents.
211
Feltenstein & See, supra note 177, at 265.
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used to experience the rewarding effects of natural survival
functions, such as eating, but creates a lasting effect that
promotes further use of the substance.212
As mentioned, however, more research is needed to
determine the specific genes involved in drug addiction
susceptibility.213 Mapping of the human genome at the beginning
of the century stirred hopes of isolating a handful of genes
primarily affecting drug addiction.214 These hopes have not yet
been realized, and researchers are still examining hundreds of
enormously complex, linked, and variant genes.215 Despite these
challenges, the concept of addiction as an interaction of genetic
and environmental factors is now the “dominant paradigm” over
the traditional view of drug abuse as an exercise of free will.216
Taken as a whole, this research indicates that drug relapse is
anything but a choice. Instead, it provides strong support for the
view that addiction and relapse are the products of genetics,
stress, and external stimuli, including the drug itself. Notably,
these factors are often unavoidable because they are a result of
genetics or are inherent in the addict’s occupation.
V. ANALYSIS

A. Why Stanford is Flawed
The Fourth Circuit’s Stanford decision is flawed for five
reasons. First, Stanford contravenes ERISA’s underlying
purpose. Second, it is at odds with the current understanding of
addiction science. Third, it fails to distinguish the risk of relapse
from other chronic ailments and thus fails to show why it should
be treated differently than those ailments. Fourth, it runs counter
to recently enacted legislation on mental health and addiction.
Finally, it disregards strong public policy arguments supporting a

212
213
214
215
216

Id.
See Gorwood et al., supra note 160, at 803.
Sellman, supra note 160, at 7.
Id.
Id.

2014.05.13 JUELL.DOCX

5/20/2014 10:44 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

1036

contrary decision. For these reasons, courts should follow the
First Circuit’s approach outlined in Colby and regard the risk of
relapse into substance abuse as a current disability.

1. The Fourth Circuit’s Stanford Decision is Contrary to
ERISA’s Purpose and Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the
Interpretation of ERISA
Congress made its purpose clear when it passed ERISA. 217
Its stated goal was to “protect interstate commerce and employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards
of conduct, responsibility and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans . . . .”218 As the Supreme Court noted in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, “ERISA abounds with the
language of trust law,” and requires that plan administrators, as
fiduciaries, uphold “certain principles developed in the evolution
of the law of trusts.”219 When ERISA administrators violate their
fiduciary duties, ERISA allows policyholders to bring a cause of
action against them.220 In Firestone, the Court referred to ERISA
section 1104, which states “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”221 The Kufner
court explained that ERISA imposes “higher than marketplace
quality standards on insurers.”222 The implication of this
requirement is that insurers must sometimes interpret ERISA
benefit plans in a way that does not maximize profitability.
Insurers who wish to avoid covering particular conditions must
write their plans in a way that clearly circumscribes their
obligations.
217

29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).

218

Id.

219

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).

220

Id.
Id. (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1974)).

221
222

Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797
(W.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105,
115 (2008)).
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This conception of ERISA is difficult to square with the
Fourth Circuit’s contention that Mr. Stanford was not entitled to
disability benefits unless he was actively abusing a drug.223 The
court argued that Mr. Stanford’s inability to return to his former
job as a nurse anesthetist was not a result of a physical or mental
impairment but rather “the result of a license limitation and the
prudence of employers.”224 The court’s narrow understanding of
“mental impairment,” which excluded addiction, is in stark
contrast to the plain language of ERISA. As the statute states,
fiduciaries are to discharge their duties “solely in the interest of
participants and beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to the participants and their beneficiaries.”225
This language indicates that addicts should be entitled to benefits
during the recovery period. While administrators have some
discretion in deciding whether a particular condition constitutes a
current disability, administrators (and the courts reviewing their
decisions) may not ignore the statute’s plain text. The insurer’s
decision to deny benefits to Mr. Stanford unless he relapsed,
upheld by the Fourth Circuit, was clearly not “solely” in his
interest and was thus contrary to the statute’s plain language.
Stanford also failed to properly account for the conflict of
interest that resulted from the insurer’s dual role as the evaluator
and payer of claims. In Firestone, the Court explained that
ERISA plan administrators often operate under a conflict of
interest and that reviewing courts should therefore consider this
as a factor in reviewing benefit denials.226 The Fourth Circuit
determined that it was to review the insurer’s determination under
223

Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2008).

224

Id.

225

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); see
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008) (“Often the
entity that administers the plan, such as an employer or an insurance company,
both determines whether an employee is eligible for benefits and pays benefits
out of its own pocket. We here decide that this dual role creates a conflict of
interest; that a reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in
determining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying
benefits; and that the significance of the factor will depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case.” (citation omitted)).
226
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a “modified abuse of discretion” standard: this standard required
it to “reduce [its] deference only to the degree necessary to
neutralize any untoward influence resulting from the insurer’s
conflict of interest, as shown in the record.”227 Because Mr.
Stanford did not demonstrate a conflict of interest, the court did
not reduce its deference.228
Several months after Stanford was decided, the Supreme
Court clarified the “conflict of interest” addressed in Firestone.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,229 Supreme Court
explicitly stated that an administrator, which both evaluates
claims and make payments, operates under a conflict of interest
(which the plaintiff need not demonstrate). It further stated that
the significance of this element is fact-specific.230 The Court noted
that while ERISA’s trust law basis requires deference to the
fiduciary’s determination, courts must take this conflict of interest
into account.231
While the Fourth Circuit later acknowledged in Champion v.
Black & Decker232 that Glenn would have required it to weigh this
conflict as a factor despite Mr. Stanford’s failure to demonstrate a
conflict, it is unlikely that this weighing would have changed the
result.233 In Stanford, the court explained that a plaintiff must
produce evidence that an administrator’s decision was motivated
by a conflict of interest.234 Since Mr. Stanford failed to produce
evidence of this motivation, the court stated that a decision to
227
228
229
230
231
232

Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 359.
See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 118.
Id. at 108.
See id. at 115.
Champion v. Black & Decker Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 355–56 (4th. Cir.

2008).
In Champion, the court stated that Glenn required it to apply the abuse
of discretion standard, not the more deferential “modified abuse of discretion
standard,” to cases such as Stanford. Id. at 355. In Champion, applying the
abuse of discretion standard, the court determined that the conflict of interest
factor carried little weight. The court acknowledged the conflict but considered
it as “one among many factors” and ruled that the ERISA administrator’s
denial of benefits was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 355–56.
234
Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008).
233
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overturn the denial would be based upon the mere existence of a
conflict, which would eliminate deference entirely.235 However,
the court indicated that the result would have been the same even
if Mr. Stanford had demonstrated a conflict: “[w]e cannot say
that [the insurer’s] conclusion is unreasonable, even in light of
[its] conflict of interest as insurer and administrator of the benefit
plan . . . .”236 The court held that the insurer’s interpretation of
the plan, that the plan did not cover the “potential risk of
relapse,” was reasonable whether or not a conflict existed.
Stanford therefore rested primarily upon the premise that the
“risk of relapse” is not a “current disability.” Such an
interpretation is inconsistent with an insurer’s requirement to
“discharge [its] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries.”237

2. Recent Psychology Research Further Undermines Stanford
A fundamental problem with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in

Stanford is that it is based on the discredited notion that an

addict’s decision to use drugs is the result of choice, and not of
disease.238 According to the Fourth Circuit, “[w]hether [a
recovering addict] succumbs to [the temptation to use drugs]
remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such
choice.”239 This notion is contrary to current psychology research
indicating that relapses can occur well into abstinence because of
lasting physical changes to the brain that result in a loss of control
over drug use.240 Recent evidence strongly undermines the notion
that continued drug use is a choice.241 With this research in mind,
235
236
237

Id. at 359.
Id. at 358.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)
(construing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1974)).
238
See Friedman, supra note 160, at 35.
239
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358.
240
See Friedman, supra note 160, at 35.
241
See generally Friedman, supra note 160; see also Gorwood et al.,
supra note 160 (describing drug dependence as a “chronic, relapsing
disorder”); Sellman, supra note 160 (describing addiction as a “complex
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it is clear that the court’s reasoning in Stanford is based on the
flawed notion that addiction is a choice, not a disease with a
strong genetic component.242
In Stanford, the insurer argued that an addict’s decision to use
drugs is a choice by defining “choice” in extremely narrow
terms. The insurer contrasted an addict to “a patient with an
unacceptably high susceptibility to suffering from a heart attack”
and declared that the patient “cannot avoid such heart attack by
choosing not to have it.”243 It is true that a recovering addict
could presumably encounter a situation in which drugs are readily
available, yet decide not to use them. In this sense, he has a
“choice” that one who is susceptible to heart attacks does not.
However, this “choice” evaporates when the addict with a genetic
predisposition and a physically altered brain is placed in a
situation in which drugs are readily available. His decision to use
drugs in such circumstances seems, if anything, less of a
“choice” than a heart attack-prone patient’s decision not to
exercise or to eat fatty foods. The insurer’s interpretation of the
word “choice” is thus extremely narrow and unfairly applied to
recovering addicts.
Even if we do accept the Fourth Circuit’s notion of addiction
as a choice, many other chronic medical conditions (for which
benefits are generally provided) are also the result of choice.244
For example, atherosclerosis, type 2 diabetes, and hypertension
are all chronic conditions that are partially the result of voluntary
behavior, such as diet.245 Unsurprisingly, the treatment for each
of these conditions often involves voluntary lifestyle changes.246
An addict’s “choice” to use drugs is not easily distinguished from
the lifestyle choices that contribute to these ailments, so to treat
addiction differently on this basis is simply unjust.
genetic disease”).
242
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358.
243
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at
7, Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 438 (E.D.N.C. 2006)
(No. 5:05-CV-372-BR(3)).
244
See Friedman, supra note 160, at 36.
245
246

Id.
See id.
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One could perhaps argue that an addict’s initial decision to
use drugs was a choice, and the lasting changes that the drugs
caused to his brain only occurred as a result of this initial choice.
Leaving addiction’s strong genetic component aside, this
argument fails to distinguish addiction for the same reasons
described in the preceding paragraph. One could argue that the
individual suffering from atherosclerosis, type 2 diabetes, or
hypertension only developed his condition as a result of his initial
unhealthy lifestyle choices, and that the continued risk of a heart
attack, for example, is a result of those earlier choices.
As argued above, psychology research has demonstrated that
drug addiction is a genetic disease, and future courts should
consider this in making their decisions. Courts often rely on
psychology research to support their holdings in areas where the
law is not settled, and the Supreme Court has done so in some
landmark decisions.247 Most notably, in Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court cited psychology research indicating that
“[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law . . . .”248 More
recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits mandatory life imprisonment without
parole for those who committed crimes prior to age eighteen.249
In support of its position, the Court stated “that developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds . . . in parts of the
brain involved in behavior control.”250 Stanford was based on the
discredited notion that an addict’s use of drugs is a “choice” and
courts should look to current research to support decisions that
recognize addiction as a genetic disease, and thus treat it as a
“current disability.”251 Scientific research is particularly useful on
this issue because the law remains unsettled.
See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012); Brown v.
Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
248
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
249
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
250
Id. at 2464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
251
See generally sources cited supra note 160 and accompanying text.
247
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Stanford is further flawed because the court denied LTD

benefits to an individual for whom returning to work would place
his health and life, as well as the health and lives of his patients,
at tremendous risk.252 An overview of current addiction research
provides overwhelming evidence that the greatest risk factors in
precipitating drug relapse are (1) stress; (2) exposure to the drug
itself; and (3) environmental cues.253 In light of these factors, it is
difficult to imagine a set of circumstances better able to
precipitate relapse than the placement of an anesthesiologist back
into a hospital setting where he previously succumbed to opioid
addiction. The high-pressure hospital setting, combined with long
hours and easily obtainable drugs of choice, makes relapse all too
likely.

3. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Distinguish the Risk of Addictive
Relapse from the Risk of Relapse of Other Chronic Ailments
The Stanford majority determined that the risk of relapse into
drug use was fundamentally different from the risk of relapse into
other chronic ailments.254 According to the court,
[a] doctor with a heart condition who enters a high
stress environment . . . “risks relapse” in the sense
that the performance of his job duties may cause a
heart attack. But an anesthetist with a drug
addiction who enters an environment where drugs
are readily available “risks relapse” only in the
sense that the ready availability of drugs increases
his temptation to resume his drug use. Whether he
succumbs to that temptation remains his choice.
252

Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 362–63 (4th Cir.
2008) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
253
See Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms, supra note 178, at
3153; see also Liu & Weiss, supra note 181, at 7856 (describing stress and
conditioned responses to drug cues as “critical factors in relapse to drug use”);
Stewart, Pathways to Relapse, supra note 179, at 125 (describing re-exposure
to the drug and exposure to stress as the two most important factors in
reinstating drug-seeking behavior).
254
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358.
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The heart-attack prone doctor has no such
choice.255
In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson was harshly critical of this
attempt to distinguish the risk of relapse from other chronic
ailments.256 As noted in Part III.A, Judge Wilkinson described the
majority’s attempt to distinguish drug addiction as “legally
ungrounded.”257 He said their attempt was based on moral and
medical considerations that the court had no authority to make
when the plan “put[] addiction squarely on all fours with other
impairments.”258 The court’s failure to distinguish addiction from
other ailments, and yet still deny benefits to Mr. Stanford,
indicates that the ongoing stigmatization of drug addiction played
a role in the court’s decision.
The majority’s attempt to cast disability as a “reward for
sobriety,” but only in the addiction context, is similarly
unpersuasive.259 In ruling for the insurer, the court acknowledged
that its denial of benefits to Mr. Stanford created a perverse
incentive by denying benefits to those in recovery while providing
them to those who relapse.260 Nevertheless, the court argued that
such reasoning assumed that disability was a “reward for
sobriety” when, in fact, the reward for sobriety was “the creation
of innumerable opportunities that were closed to Stanford as long
as he continued to use drugs.”261 It is unclear why the Fourth
Circuit apparently confined this logic to recovering addicts. The
court’s logic seems to imply that, like the recovering addict, the
heart attack-prone doctor should not be entitled to benefits
because his reward for adopting a healthier lifestyle is the
“innumerable opportunities that were closed to” him before he
changed his ways. Despite this obvious inconsistency, the court
suggested that a heart attack-prone doctor should be entitled to
benefits.
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

Id.
Id. at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 359.
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 359.
Id.
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The Stanford majority’s contention that Mr. Stanford could
work “countless other jobs” and therefore should not be entitled
to benefits is similarly flawed.262 First, as Judge Wilkinson
argued in his dissent, the plan’s plain language defined disability
as an inability “to perform the material and substantial duties of
your regular occupation.”263 Even with this plain language issue
aside, the situation the majority describes is not unique to
individuals recovering from drug addiction. For example, in
Evans v. UnumProvident Corp.,264 the court held that an insurer’s
denial of LTD benefits to a plaintiff who suffered from a form of
epilepsy was arbitrary and capricious.265 In making its
determination, the court noted that while the plaintiff was capable
of performing sedentary work, she was still disabled because the
stressful nature of her work contributed to her recurrent
seizures.266 Presumably, the plaintiff was capable of performing
other, less stressful jobs, but this fact did not render her ineligible
for LTD benefits. In this sense, her condition was no different
from that of an anesthesiologist who is physically capable of
performing other jobs, yet cannot return to anesthesiology
because the stressful nature of the job contributes to relapse. In
either case, the individual lacks a functional impairment that
renders him unable to physically perform some type of
occupation, yet LTD benefits will still be provided; there is no
compelling reason to treat the two conditions differently.

4. Recent Policy Enactments Support the View that Addiction
Should be Treated Like Other Ailments
The notion that addiction should be treated like other ailments
is supported by congressional legislation.267 On November 8,
262
263
264

See id. at 359–60.
Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 879–80 (6th Cir.

2006).

Id. at 869.
Id. at 879–80.
267
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1996); see also Ellen Weber, Equality
Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental Health Parity and
265
266
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2013, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
Kathleen Sebelius announced regulations that would enforce the
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (Parity
Act)268 and extend its reach to those receiving coverage under the
Affordable Care Act.269 Congress enacted the Parity Act in order
to prevent health plans from discriminating against individuals
with mental and substance abuse disorders by requiring that the
plans’ standards for those conditions be comparable to those for
other medical conditions.270 The Parity Act prohibits “limits on
the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage or
other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment” when
such conditions are not imposed upon coverage for other medical
conditions.271 It also prohibits plans from imposing more stringent
financial requirements upon those suffering from mental health
issues or addiction.272 This means that plans cannot impose
different “deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, [or] out-ofpocket expenses” on mental health and addiction treatment.273
The Parity Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress
intended to curtail the widespread practice of insurer
discrimination against those with mental illness and substancerelated disorders.274 The Committee on Ways and Means issued a
report stating: “[t]he Committee believes that the discrimination
Addiction Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 179,
207–08 (2013).
268
29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2008).
269
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See also
Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, Rules to Require Equal Coverage for Mental
Ills,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
8,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/
rules-to-require-equal-coverage-for-mental-ills.html.
270
Weber, supra note 267, at 207–08.
271
Id. at 210.
272
273

Id.
Id. It is important to note that the Parity Act does not require plans to

cover mental health or substance disorder benefits. It only requires that when
such benefits are provided, they must be on equal footing with medical and
surgical benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)–(b) (2012).
274
H.R. REP. NO. 110-374, at 1551 (2007).
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that exists under many group health plans with respect to mental
health and substance-related disorder benefits must be prohibited.
Diseases of the mind should be afforded the same treatment as
diseases of the body.”275 The Committee went on to describe
addiction and mental health disorders as “the only disorders that
have been systematically and unfairly excluded from equal
coverage.”276 The Parity Act and its legislative history
demonstrate Congress’ intent to fight arbitrary and discriminatory
treatment of those suffering from addiction or mental illness.277
In Stanford, the insurer had apparently discriminated against
Mr. Stanford because his impairment was “mental.” The plan
required benefits once the claimant established an “injury or
sickness caus[ing] physical or mental impairment to such a degree
of severity that [he is] . . . continuously unable to perform the
material and substantial duties of [his] regular occupation.”278 The
insurer explained that Mr. Stanford did not suffer “a physical or
mental impairment as a result of his drug use or recovery” and
that being an addict did not render him unable to perform the
material duties of his occupation.279 The insurer’s narrow
understanding of “mental impairment” was unjustified, and the
Fourth Circuit should not have upheld it.

5. Providing LTD Benefits to Recovering Addicts is Good Public
Policy
There are compelling public policy arguments for providing
LTD benefits to recovering drug addicts. The Committee on
Ways and Means’ reasons for passing the Parity Act are equally
applicable to the “addiction as a current disability” debate.280 The
Committee cited a 2006 study that described the prevalence of
mental and substance abuse-related disorders, which affected
nearly a quarter of the U.S. population and cost more than $300
275
276
277

Id.
Id.
Id.

278

Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 2008).

279

Id.

280

H.R. REP. NO. 110-374, at 1569–70.
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billion annually.281 A recent study found that 22.2 million
Americans suffered from substance abuse or dependence in 2012,
a number that had remained stable over the prior decade.282
As mentioned, a number of courts have also made compelling
public policy arguments for treating the risk of relapse into drug
addiction as a “current disability.”283 Even in Stanford, the
majority acknowledged that its denial of benefits to Mr. Stanford
“create[d] a somewhat troubling—some might say perverse—
incentive structure: an addict who continues to abuse drugs will
be entitled to long-term benefits, but upon choosing sobriety will
lose those benefits unless he again begins to use drugs.”284 As
Judge Wilkinson argued in his dissent, “[f]orcing Stanford to
relapse into addiction or lose his benefits would. . .thwart the
very purpose for which disability plans exist: to help people
overcome medical adversity if possible, and otherwise to cope
with it.”285 Few would argue that a bartender who was forced to
leave work as a result of alcoholism should be compelled to
return to work during recovery because his benefits would
discontinue. Disability plans should not force addicted individuals
to choose between losing benefit payments on the one hand and
relapsing on the other.
The Kufner court also considered public policy implications in
its decision to treat the risk of relapse as a current disability.286 It
described the insurer’s implication that the plaintiff could return
to work until he suffered a relapse as “untenable given the serious
risk this poses to public health and safety, which the Court
considers an additional factor weighing against defendant’s
281
282

Id.

U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2012
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL
FINDINGS,
available
at
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/
2012SummNatFindDetTables/NationalFindings/NSDUHresults2012.htm#ch7.
283
See, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013);
Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich.
2009).
284
Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2008).
285
Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
286
Kufner, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 796.
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benefits determination.”287 As described in Part III.B, the court
labeled this risk “a form of ‘benefits Russian roulette’ with
plaintiff’s career and his patients’ lives at risk.”288 The court
further described the insurer’s position as “tantamount to a
breach of the public trust” and clearly contrary to its duties under
ERISA.289 While danger to the public is particularly acute in the
anesthesiology context, it is also a serious concern in other areas
as well. For example, a relapsed crane operator, air traffic
controller, or train engineer could pose tremendous risks to the
public. None should be forced to choose between relapsing and
losing benefits.

B. A Middle Ground Between Colby and Stanford?
In Colby, the First Circuit proposed an untenable middle
ground between its own holding and that in Stanford. According
to the court, on remand, the insurer could have examined whether
the risk of relapse decreased over time and, if it did, argued for a
corresponding benefit reduction.290 Instead, the insurer took a
categorical approach and argued that any risk of relapse, no
matter how severe, did not constitute a current disability under
the plan.291 The result of this all-or-nothing approach was the
court’s award of a full thirty-six months of benefits.292
This argument, that the risk of relapse progressively
diminishes over time, is unsupported by current psychology
research.293 As noted previously, substance abuse causes lasting
changes in the brain, and these changes play a significant role in
precipitating relapse.294 Research also demonstrates that
“exposure to a drug can initiate neurochemical changes with
287
288
289

Id.
Id.
Id. at 796–97.

290

Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013).

291

Id.
Id. at 68.

292
293

Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms, supra note 178, at

3147.
294

Id.
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enduring molecular and anatomical consequences that affect
subsequent responses to events that induce relapse.”295 These
changes “continue to manifest themselves well into abstinence
and may be a cause of the relapses into compulsive drug use that
can occur long after the drug has been cleared from the body.”296
While a recent study of methamphetamine-dependent individuals
found some evidence that impulsive decision making decreases
over time, the study also found evidence that cue-induced
cravings increase over time, and therefore concluded that the risk
of relapse does not decline with abstinence.297 The First Circuit’s
proposed alternative argument finds little support in recent
psychology research.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under LTD plans, there is no principled reason to
differentiate the risk of addictive relapse from other medical
impairments.298 Accordingly, other courts should follow the First
Circuit’s Colby decision. The Fourth Circuit’s Stanford decision
contravenes Supreme Court precedent, which had illustrated the
high standards that ERISA places upon plan administrators. These
standards require administrators to discharge their duties “solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,” not in their
own financial self-interest, as the insurer apparently did in
Stanford.299 Stanford also contravenes current psychology
research, which shows that addiction is not a “choice” but a
disease that physically changes the brain in ways that last well
into abstinence.300 Thus, a recovering addict who is not actively
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using drugs is still “currently disabled” and should be entitled to
LTD benefits under ERISA-governed LTD benefit plans.
Furthermore, Stanford could have dire ramifications. It
incentivizes recovering addicts to return to work before they are
ready. With regard to anesthesiology, this inhibits the recovery
process by placing addicts into an environment that is extremely
conducive to relapse due to high stress levels and easily
accessible drugs. Patients are similarly put at risk because
anesthesiology is a crucial and complex component of many
medical procedures. The risks of Stanford-like decisions are not
limited to anesthesiology, but extend to any occupation that
affects public safety and health.
The First Circuit’s Colby decision, holding that the risk of
relapse into drug addiction can be so severe as to constitute a
current disability, avoids these potentially disastrous
consequences. Further, Colby holds true to the congressional
intent behind ERISA and the Parity Act. The Parity Act reflects a
larger societal trend that recognizes the devastating effects of
addiction and sees it as a disease rather than a choice or lack of
willpower. Additionally, society has increasingly come to
recognize that the way to deal with the pervasive problem of drug
addiction is not to stigmatize users or blame them for poor
decision-making, but to treat their condition as a chronic ailment
on par with any other. Courts should therefore follow the First
Circuit’s lead and do their part to move society forward on this
issue.

